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Mixing Law and Equity Causes of 
Action Does Not Preclude a  
Jury Trial 
 
Philip M. Halpern 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Article I, Section 2 of the New York State Constitution 
guarantees as “inviolate forever” the right to a jury trial in civil 
cases.1  This right, guaranteed by both the Constitution and 
further codified by statute, has been regarded as “fundamental 
and sacred to the citizen,”2  but it can nevertheless be waived in 
various ways.3  In addition to waiver caused by the failure to 
demand a jury trial in the note of issue and the express waiver 
of the right by the parties,4 a party may also waive a right to trial 
 
 Philip M. Halpern is the Managing Partner of Collier, Halpern, Newberg & 
Nolletti, LLP in White Plains, N.Y. and specializes in commercial litigation 
with more than 80 reported decisions. Mr. Halpern is certified by the National 
Board of Trial Advocacy as a Civil Trial Advocate and a Civil Pretrial Advocate, 
a Fellow of the American Bar Foundation as well as the New York Bar 
Foundation and a member of the Office of Court Administration’s Advisory 
Committee on Civil Practice. 
1. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
2. Jacob v. New York, 315 U.S. 752, 752-53 (1942) (Murphy, J.) (“The right 
of jury trial in civil cases at common law . . . should be jealously guarded by the 
courts.”). 
3. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4102(a) (McKinney 2015) (“Any party may demand a trial 
by jury . . . by . . . filing a note of issue containing a demand for trial by jury. 
Any party served with a note of issue not containing such a demand may 
demand a trial by jury by serving upon each party a demand for a trial by jury 
. . . . If no party shall demand a trial by jury as provided herein, the right to 
trial by jury shall be deemed waived by all parties.”). 
4. A waiver of the right to a jury occurs when the parties fail to appear at 
the trial, file a written waiver with the clerk or orally waive the right to a jury 
trial in open court. Id. 4102(c). Parties may expressly agree to waive the right 
to jury trial, and courts will enforce a contractual provision that waives said 
right. Gunn v. Palmieri, 589 N.Y.S.2d 577 (App. Div. 1992); Chem. Bank v. 
Summers, 413 N.Y.S.2d 148 (App. Div. 1979); Franklin Nat’l Bank of Long 
Island v. Capobianco, 266 N.Y.S.2d 961 (App. Div. 1966). The New York Court 
of Appeals has held that the right to waive constitutional rights, like the right 
1
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by jury if a court determines that the matter before it seeks both 
legal and imperatively required equitable relief arising out of the 
same transaction—a circumstance which is the subject matter of 
this article. 
Mixing law and equity may, but does not always, preclude a 
jury.5  Courts must engage in a detailed analysis to determine 
whether the right to a trial by jury exists in any given civil 
action.6  This article addresses the results of the analysis that 
has been developed by courts as to the jury waiver resulting from 
the combination of legal and equitable causes of action arising 
from the same transaction.  Ultimately a rule has emerged from 
the case law that equitable claims that are “incidental”7 to legal 
claims or are separate transactions predicated upon separate 
time and purpose, but are brought in the same action, do not 
 
to a trial by jury, will not be interfered with by the Courts.  Wolf v. Assessors 
of the Town of Hanover, 126 N.E.2d 537 (N.Y. 1955); In re Estate of Malloy, 17 
N.E.2d 108 (N.Y. 1938). 
5. “It is often said a joinder of legal and equitable claims works a waiver 
of right to a trial by jury. The statement is too broad.” Meltzer v. Lincoln Square 
Apartments Section V, 515 N.Y.S.2d 208, 209 (Civ. Ct. 1987). 
6. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State, 550 N.E.2d 919 (N.Y. 1990) 
(analyzing the constitutionality of a provision relating to the New Car Lemon 
Law providing for an alternative arbitration mechanism). The Court of Appeals 
explained its analysis in the context of contract law: 
 
Analysis starts by recognizing that judicial remedies for 
breach of contract may be characterized as either “legal” or 
“equitable” depending on whether they were available in the 
common-law courts or in courts of equity. The principal 
“legal” remedy to enforce a contract is a judgment awarding a 
sum of money. This is a type of “substitutional” relief 
“intended to give the promisee something in substitution for 
the promised performance, as when the court awards a buyer 
of goods money damages instead of the goods.” The principal 
“equitable” remedy to enforce a contract is an order requiring 
specific performance of the contract. This is a type of “specific” 
relief “intended to produce as nearly as is practicable the 
same effect that the performance due under a contract would 
have produced. The remedy of specific performance allows a 
court to compel a party to a contract to perform, “if not 
exactly, at least substantially, what he has undertaken to do.” 
 
Id. at 922 (citations omitted). 
7. See infra Part III for a discussion of the distinction between “incidental” 
equitable claims and those which are imperatively required to afford full relief 
to the pleader. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/1
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preclude a party’s right to a jury trial.8  Claims which were 
historically equitable have blended into law such that the line 
distinguishing the two has become blurred.  Trials involve 
multiple, complex issues and the determination of claims calling 
for legal relief frequently are predicated upon the same set of 
facts as those claims calling for equitable relief.  All of these 
factors have led toward divergent results and disagreement 
among courts and judges concerning waiver of a jury trial in 
actions mixing law and equity causes of action. 
This article addresses the issue of the preclusion of jury 
trials in actions which contemplate both legal and equitable 
relief.  Part II of this article addresses the constitutional and 
statutory history of New York Civil Practice Law and Rules 
(“CPLR”) Section 4101 concerning issues triable by a jury and 
the dichotomy between those actions triable by a jury and 
equitable actions triable by the court alone.  Part III of this 
article addresses the interplay between CPLR Sections 4101 and 
4102, concerning demand and waiver of trial by jury, and the 
analysis developed by the courts to determine whether a jury 
trial has been waived in the context of civil actions seeking both 
legal and equitable relief arising out of the same transaction.  
Part IV of this article addresses the evolution toward non-jury 
trial in England and Wales and the policy in favor of non-jury 
trials in civil actions today. 
This article is written to encourage New York advocates to 
examine closely the analyses developed and the results which 
have emerged concerning waiver of a jury trial by the joinder of 
law and equity claims.  Trial by jury, so fundamental to the 
 
8. See Poley v. Rochester Cmty. Sav. Bank, 584 N.Y.S.2d 690 (App. Div. 
1992) (fraudulent inducement in entering contract is separate from breach of 
such contract); Regan v. Martindale, 421 N.Y.S.2d 209 (App. Div. 1979) 
(equitable causes of action arose earlier in time than the legal causes of action 
and thus constituted separate transactions); Fleischer v. Inst. for Research in 
Hypnosis, 394 N.Y.2d 1 (App. Div. 1977) (cause of action for libel is separate 
from cause of action for republication of such libel). Transactions are also 
considered “separate transactions” when they involve different instruments, 
see, e.g., In re Estate of Aronoff, 653 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sur. Ct. 1996); different 
projects, see, e.g., First Keystone Consultants, Inc. v. DDR Constr. Servs., 880 
N.Y.S.2d 223 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. 2008); separate occurrences between the 
same parties, see, e.g., Maharam v. Maharam, 575 N.Y.S.2d 846 (App. Div. 
1991); or when the actions, although related, involve separate and distinct 
parties, see, e.g., Misra v. Yedid, No. 603857/03, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 9026 
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. June 5, 2008). 
3
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American and New York systems of jurisprudence, should not be 
deemed waived, and is not waived, merely because litigants seek 
both legal and equitable relief arising from the same transaction.  
There is a careful analysis meant to be employed to protect the 
sacred right to a trial by jury, and an advocate confronted with 
the issue should make certain that the court properly utilizes it. 
 
II. Constitutional Roots and History of CPLR Section 4101 
 
To understand the present scope of the right to a trial by 
jury in civil actions, it is necessary to examine the constitutional 
and statutory history of the right.9  The United States 
Constitution has preserved the right to a jury trial in “[s]uits at 
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars . . . .”10   The New York Constitution provides for trial by 
jury in civil actions “in all cases in which it has heretofore been 
guaranteed . . . .”11  In addition to the constitutional right, this 
right has been further codified in CPLR Section 4101. The cases 
in which jury trials are required are generally those actions that 
evolved through the common law courts versus those developed 
in the equity courts, which are tried by the court alone.12 
Courts of equity were the chancery courts and existed 
historically as an entirely separate department from the 
Supreme Court, imitating the historical arrangement in place in 
England.13  A primary reason for the development of the 
 
9. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 550 N.E.2d at 921 (“[A]n examination of the 
constitutional sources which previously ‘guaranteed’ a trial by jury is necessary 
to determine the scope of the present right.”). Whether N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4101 is 
constitutional has been called into question, and at least one court has opined 
that it may be unconstitutional. Hudson View II Assocs. v. Gooden, 644 
N.Y.S.2d 512, 515 (App. Div. 1996) (“Parenthetically, it may be noted that 
despite the salutary purpose of CPLR 4101, the arguably unconstitutional 
deprivation of a jury trial for certain equitable defenses which were statutorily 
required to be tried by jury prior to the adoption of the 1894 [C]onstitution has 
not gone completely unnoticed.”) (citations omitted). 
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
11. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
12. See Hudson View II Assocs., 644 N.Y.S.2d at 514 (“[G]enerally, if a 
matter was historically cognizable at equity, where there were no juries, no 
right to a jury exists today. If, however, a matter would historically have been 
decided in the common-law courts before a jury, the right to a jury still exists.”). 
13. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Philip Mazzei (Nov. 1785), in 9 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1 NOVEMBER 1785 – 22 JUNE 1786, 67–72 (Julian 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/1
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chancery courts was to provide a means of redress where the 
common law provided an inadequate remedy or no remedy at 
all.14  In equity, generally the court’s power is to direct someone 
to act or to forbear from acting, which circumstances clearly 
cannot be redressed by the award of money damages. 
In New York, with the passage of the 1846 Constitution, law 
and equity were merged so that jurisdiction could be had by the 
same tribunal regardless of the nature of the suit.15  Legal and 
equitable jurisdictions were thus combined in the same court, 
but the principles of each “remain[ed] distinctive and 
undisturbed.”16  Before the adoption of the CPLR in 1963, the 
 
P. Boyd ed., 1954), available at http://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Jefferson/01-09-02-0056 (“The system of law in most of the United States, in 
imitation of that of England, is divided into two departments, the Common law 
and the Chancery.”). 
14. See Phillips v. Gorham, 17 N.Y. 270 (1858). See also Wooden v. Waffle, 
6 How. Pr. 145, 150 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851) (“Here, then, is cause enough for the 
existence of the Court in Chancery. Compensation in damages being an utterly 
inadequate remedy in numerous cases, the prerogatives of the crown, and the 
principles of Roman jurisprudence were resorted to, for some other mode of 
redress in such cases. A court with ample equity powers was the result.”). 
15. See N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 5-6 (1846). “On the first Monday of July, 
one thousand eight hundred and forty-seven, jurisdiction of all suits and 
proceedings then pending in the present supreme court [sic] and court of 
chancery, and all suits and proceedings originally commenced and then 
pending in any court of common pleas . . . shall become vested in the supreme 
court hereby established.” Id. § 5. 
16. N.Y. & New Haven R.R. v. Schuyler, 34 N.Y. 30, 46 (1865). The court 
was clear that a plaintiff is not deprived of any right to jury trial when it mixes 
claims for legal and equitable relief under the new merged system of law and 
equity because the principles of equity dictate the mode of trial: 
 
It is a primary consequence of a resort to a court of equity that 
trial by jury is no matter of right, and wherever the equity of 
the complainant’s bill gives such a court jurisdiction, it draws 
to the same forum and mode of trial every question, whether 
its nature be legal or equitable, that can be legitimately 
considered within its scope….Whenever a plaintiff calls upon 
the court to exercise its jurisdiction upon principles of equity, 
he elects thereby his mode of trial and waives any 
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Field Code of 184817 and the Throop Code of 187718 provided a 
statutory basis for the right to juries in civil actions and 
enumerated the kinds of actions triable by jury. 
The 1894 Constitution guaranteed the right to a jury trial in 
all cases as it had “heretofore been used”19 and the 1938 
Constitution preserved the right to a jury trial only as it was 
“heretofore . . . guaranteed by constitutional provision.”20  Taken 
together, this language guaranteed a jury trial in all those cases 
to which it would have traditionally been afforded under the 
common law before 1777 and in the cases to which the legislature 
extended a right to a jury trial by statute between 1777 and 
1894.21  The effect was to “freeze” the right to a jury trial to those 
types of cases in which the right was recognized at common law 
or by statute as of 1894.22  In addition, it has been held that the 
right to a jury trial is not strictly limited to those instances in 
which it was actually used in 1894, but also extends to new cases 
that are analogous to those traditionally tried by a jury.23 
CPLR Section 4101 provides in relevant part: 
 
 
17. NEW YORK CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (John S. Voorhies ed., 2d ed. 
1852) (1848) [hereinafter citations to the New York Code of Civil Procedure of 
1848 will be cited as FIELD CODE followed by the relevant section number]. 
18. NEW YORK CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Weed, Parsons & Co. 1881) 
(1877) [hereinafter citations to the New York Code of Civil Procedure of 1877 
will be cited as THROOP CODE followed by the relevant section number] (as 
explained by the drafters in the introduction to the Code, the first thirteen 
chapters, submitted to the legislature by the commissioners in the form of a 
bill, took effect on September 1, 1877. The other nine chapters passed both 
houses in 1877 but were vetoed by the governor and did not become law until 
May 6, 1880). 
19. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1894) (“The trial by jury in all cases in which it 
has heretofore been used shall remain inviolate forever; but a jury trial may be 
waived by the parties in all civil cases in the manner to be prescribed by law.”). 
20. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1938). 
21. See In re DES Mkt. Share Litig., 591 N.E.2d 226 (N.Y. 1992); In re 
Estate of Luria, 313 N.Y.S.2d 12, 15-16 (Sur. Ct. Kings Cnty. 1970) (“A good 
many statutes were enacted between 1777 and 1894 which extended the right 
to trial by jury . . . . Among the more common cases were actions for divorce, 
annulment, partition, claims to real property, mandamus, and . . . ‘discovery’ 
proceedings, i.e., claims by personal representatives to recover property 
belonging to the estate.”). 
22. Indep. Church of Realization of Word of God, Inc. v. Bd. of Assessors, 
420 N.Y.S.2d 765, 765 (App. Div. 1979). 
23. See In re DES Mkt. Share Litig., 591 N.E.2d at 229; Indep. Church, 420 
N.Y.S.2d at 765. See also Colon v. Lisk, 47 N.E. 302, 303 (N.Y. 1897). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/1
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In the following actions, the issues of fact shall be 
tried by a jury . . . (1) an action in which a party 
demands and sets forth facts which would permit 
a judgment for a sum of money only; (2) an action 
of ejectment; for dower; for waste; for abatement 
of and damages for a nuisance; to recover a 
chattel; or for determination of a claim to real 
property under article fifteen of the real property 
actions and proceedings law; and (3) any other 
action in which a party is entitled by the 
constitution or by express provision of law to a 
trial by jury.24 
 
This section takes much of its language from section 968 of the 
Throop Code of 1877.25 
The first subsection reflects the most common action triable 
by jury, which is an action pleading facts to support a judgment 
for monetary damages.  It is slightly different from the Throop 
Code’s provision, which only required that the complaint demand 
such judgment.  Today, New York courts must engage in an 
analysis of the pleadings to determine whether the right to a jury 
trial attaches.  The fact that the complaint demands judgment 
for a sum of money only is not sufficient to make that 
determination.26 
The second paragraph is almost identical to Throop Code, 
with the exception of the nuisance action.  Under the Throop 
Code, an action for a nuisance was to be tried by jury.  This did 
not take into account the pleading of a claim to enjoin a nuisance, 
which is an equitable action.27  The CPLR, however, makes clear 
that only actions “for abatement of and damages for a nuisance” 
are triable by a jury, precluding a jury trial in those equitable 
 
24. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4101 (McKinney 2015). 
25. “In each of the following actions, an issue of fact must be tried by a 
jury, unless a jury trial is waived, or a reference is directed: 1. An action in 
which the complaint demands judgment for a sum of money only. 2. An action 
of ejectment; for dower; for waste; for a nuisance; or to recover a chattel.” 
THROOP CODE § 968. 
26. See infra Part III. 
27. See Johnson v. Delano, 150 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cnty. 1956); 
Cogswell v. The N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R., 11 N.E. 518 (N.Y. 1887). 
7
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claims respecting nuisances.28 
The third paragraph derives from Throop Code section 970, 
which provides for a jury trial on any issues of fact arising in an 
action that is not one enumerated in section 968.29  It is a catch-
all provision, underscoring the right to a jury trial conferred by 
the Constitution and by statute in the many actions that are not 
specified in paragraphs one and two.30 
Determining today whether a cause of action calls for 
equitable relief or legal relief requires tracing the action at hand 
back to how it would be treated at common law.  If the cause of 
action would have been afforded the right to a jury trial under 
the common law before the first Constitution, or if between 1777 
and 1894 the cause of action was granted the right by statute, 
then the right to a jury trial should attach today.  If it was 
equitable, then no right should attach.  If the cause of action does 
not have such traceable roots,31 the courts must first incorporate 
an analysis to determine which of the traditional actions would 
have been used to present the claim had the newly-created cause 
of action at use not been created.32 
The confusion and difficulty created by the merger of law 
and equity with respect to the mode and procedure of trying the 
issues presented by the plaintiff’s case are also present in the 
 
28. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4101(2). 
29. See THROOP CODE § 970. 
30. A summary proceeding to recover possession of real property is an 
example. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 745(1) (McKinney 2014) (“Where triable 
issues of fact are raised, they shall be tried by the court unless, at the time the 
petition is noticed to be heard, a party demands a trial by jury, in which case 
trial shall be by jury.”).  
31. An example would be the declaratory judgment action which did not 
come into existence until the twentieth century. See Kalisch-Jarcho, Inc. v. City 
of New York, 533 N.E.2d 258 (N.Y. 1988); Town Bd. of Town of Greece v. 
Murray, 223 N.Y.S. 606 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Cnty. 1927); 43 N.Y. JUR. 2D 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS § 2 (2007). 
32. See Solnick v. Whalen, 401 N.E.2d 190 (N.Y. 1980); Martell v. N. River 
Ins. Co., 484 N.Y.S.2d 363 (App. Div. 1985); Indep. Church of Realization of 
Word of God, Inc. v. Bd. of Assessors, 420 N.Y.S.2d 765 (App. Div. 1979). In a 
case presenting a variety of causes of action, the court may not necessarily need 
to determine how a cause of action would have been presented at common law 
if the thrust, gravamen or primary character of the facts pled and demand for 
relief are clearly legal and warranting jury trial, or are clearly equitable to 
which no right to jury trial would attach. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/1
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issues raised by defenses.33  Prior to the merger of law and 
equity, if a party desired to assert an equitable issue, it had to 
be brought as an affirmative suit to be tried by the court alone.  
After the merger, the Court of Appeals held that an equitable 
issue could be raised directly by the answer to the action.34  A 
defendant no longer had to commence a separate proceeding to 
assert its equitable defenses seeking affirmative relief.  If a 
plaintiff brought an action that would be considered an action at 
law, a jury trial right attached to the equitable defenses as well.35  
However, if, in tracing its roots, an action was considered 
equitable, any defenses raised to the action were to be tried by 
the court and the defendant was not entitled to a jury.36 
The procedure and mode of the trial of counterclaims did not 
get the same treatment as defenses.  The Throop Code directed 
that, with respect to a jury trial of counterclaims, the mode of 
trial of an issue of fact arising upon a counterclaim would be the 
same as if the issue had arisen in a direct action for the same 
cause.37  In interpreting this provision of the Throop Code, courts 
held that if the defendant’s equitable claim was truly a 
counterclaim demanding affirmative relief, it was to be tried by 
the court without a jury; if the counterclaim was merely an 
equitable defense to the action, it was to be tried by a jury if 
either party had demanded a jury.38  The reasoning behind this 
 
33. Phillips v. Gorham, 17 N.Y. 270 (1858). Following a jury verdict for 
plaintiff, defendant argued on appeal that plaintiff should have procured a 
judgment declaring the deed at issue be determined to be void before bringing 
the action to recover possession of land instead of having one trial on all the 
issues. Id. The court explained that under the new merged system, the plaintiff 
may unite several causes of action, legal or equitable or both, in the same 
complaint. Id. Rejecting the defendant’s argument, the court noted that “all the 
inconvenience, which is alleged as an argument against allowing legal and 
equitable grounds of claim to be united in a complaint, equally exists against 
allowing an equitable answer to a legal claim.” Id. at 275. 
34. See Haire v. Baker, 5 N.Y. 357, 362 (1851). 
35. See Southard v. Curley, 31 N.E. 330 (N.Y. 1892); Pitcher v. Hennessey, 
48 N.Y. 415 (1872); N.Y. Cent. Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Prot. Ins. Co., 14 N.Y. 85 (1856); 
Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N.Y. 156 (1854); Wooden v. Waffle, 6 How. Pr. 145 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1851). 
36. See Wurster v. Armfield, 90 N.Y.S. 699 (App. Div. 1904); King v. Ross, 
51 N.Y.S. 138 (App. Div. 1898). 
37. THROOP CODE § 974. 
38. See Strauss & Co. v. Am. Credit Ind. Ins. Co., 196 N.Y.S. 708 (App. 
Div. 1922); Menado Corp. v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 279 N.Y.S.2d 84, 86 (Civ. 
Ct. 1967) (citing Susquehanna S.S. Co. v. Anderson & Co., 146 N.E. 381 (N.Y. 
9
  
816 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  35:3 
dichotomy stems from the fact that the bringing of an equitable 
counterclaim is a voluntary act while an equitable defense is 
necessarily dictated by the nature of the plaintiff’s causes of 
action, and, if not raised right then, the defense would be 
waived.39  Parenthetically, CPLR Section 4101 disconnected 
equitable defenses from the legal action, directing that they be 
tried solely by the court—hence a number of commentators 
question its constitutionality.40 
Some courts believed that juries were not competent to hear 
cases comprised of multiple issues, especially those involving 
equitable claims.41  The concern was that juries were composed 
of laymen, and it was impossible for all of those impaneled to be 
able to sift through multiple issues and follow the rules of law as 
well as the court would.42  This belief and concern was a driving 
force in England, where they now have practically instituted 
juryless civil trials.43  In New York in the modern era, however, 
the ability of juries to competently try the facts of complex cases 
should not be underestimated.  It is not the role of the jury to 
decide the law, select evidence or structure the mode of the trial.  
 
1925)); Bennett v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 46 N.Y.S. 459 (App. Div. 
1897); Walker v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 38 N.E. 106 (N.Y. 1894); Pitcher, 48 N.Y. 
at 415. 
39. See Hudson View II Assocs. v. Gooden, 644 N.Y.S.2d 512 (App. Div. 
1996). 
40. See infra Part III.C. 
41. See Bennett v. Edison Illuminating Co. of Brooklyn, 58 N.E. 7 (N.Y. 
1900) (Parker, J., dissenting) (“In the view of our jurisprudence . . . a jury 
cannot as well and as safely as a court try equitable issues.”); Guar. Trust Co. 
v. Robinson, 64 N.Y.S. 366 (Sup. Ct. Chemung Cnty. 1900) (“It is quite 
reasonable to suppose that injustice might be done to all parties by the 
submission to a jury of the various and perplexing questions which would 
necessarily be raised on the trial of this action”); Wooden v. Waffle, 6 How. Pr. 
145, 150 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851) (“Could a jury adjust the equities and counter 
equities in a complicated case, and mete out the precise relief which justice 
might require? There is a moral impossibility in this. What twelve men would 
ever agree upon the terms of an equity decree?”). 
42. As Judge Jerome Frank wrote of the federal civil jury, “while the jury 
can contribute nothing of value so far as the law is concerned, it has infinite 
capacity for mischief, for twelve men can easily misunderstand more law in a 
minute than the judge can explain in an hour.” Skidmore v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 
167 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1948). “[I]ssues to be tried by a jury were required to 
be single and decisive. Single, because double and complex issues would tend 
to embarrass and confuse, and lead to disagreement; and decisive, because 
otherwise no judgment could follow the finding.” Wooden, 6 How. Pr. at 150. 
43. See infra Part IV. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/1
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The tasks of presenting the case to the jury in a clear, 
demystified manner and of arranging the trial and the order of 
issues to be decided are properly charged to the litigants, their 
counsel and the court.  Because the civil jury—and the litigants’ 
right to it—is so important, the courts have developed detailed 
analyses to determine when the right to a jury trial should 
attach, when the right must not attach and when the right has 
been waived. 
 
III.   Waiving the Jury: Judicial Analyses 
 
Under the rule of joinder, where a plaintiff has two or more 
entirely separate claims emanating from separate transactions, 
he can sue on them in one action.44  CPLR Section 4102(c) 
provides that a party has not waived his right to a trial by jury 
by joining a legal claim with another claim not triable by jury 
which arose out of a separate transaction.45  Thus, a plaintiff is 
entitled to a jury trial on its legal claims for relief when its 
equitable claims for relief arise out of an entirely separate 
transaction than that which gave rise to its legal claims. 
CPLR Section 4102 works in conjunction with Section 4101 
regarding demand and waiver of trial by jury.  If an action is 
triable of right by a jury, a jury trial still must be affirmatively 
demanded in the note of issue.46  If a party served with a note of 
issue not containing the demand wants a jury trial, it must then 
file a demand for trial by jury.47  If no party demands trial in one 
of these ways, trial by jury is waived.48  As CPLR Section 4101 
enumerates the actions triable by jury, CPLR Section 4102 may 
operate to preclude a jury trial in actions that join a claim for 
relief that is triable of right by jury with one that is not.49 
 
44. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 601 (McKinney 2015). 
45. A party does not waive jury trial on a claim which carries the right to 
jury trial, “by joining it with another claim with respect to which there is no 
right to trial by jury and which is based upon a separate transaction.” Id. 
4102(c) (emphasis added). 
46. See id. 4102(a); Downing v. Downing, 302 N.Y.S.2d 334 (App. Div. 
1969). 
47. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4102(a). 
48. Id. 
49. See Meltzer v. Lincoln Square Apartments Section V, 515 N.Y.S.2d 208 
(Civ. Ct. 1987). In Meltzer, the plaintiff asserted two legal causes of action 
11
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A. Legal and Equitable Claims Arising Out of the Same 
Transaction 
 
Where a plaintiff who wants a jury trial pleads law and 
equity claims which are based upon the same transaction, CPLR 
Sections 4101 and 4102 come into play, and courts interpreting 
these rules have created several contours to consider. The 
general rule has been that the right to a jury trial is waived when 
a plaintiff mixes legal and equitable claims arising from the 
same transaction.50 
Another general rule has evolved: if the equity claims are 
imperatively required to afford full relief to the pleader, or if the 
primary thrust of the action is equitable, then there is no right 
to a jury trial.51  If on the other hand, the equity claims are 
incidental to the legal claims, such that money damages alone 
would afford full relief to the pleader, then the pleading of those 
 
arising out of the same wrong: breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment in her 
lease and the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Id. at 208. 
Plaintiff’s lease contained a jury waiver clause, which was null and void as to 
the second cause of action pursuant to Real Property Law § 259-c, but which 
the first cause of action was subject to.  Id. at 209.  Plaintiff demanded a jury, 
and defendant moved to strike on the grounds of contractual waiver.  Id. The 
court, faced with an issue of apparent first impression, explained that because 
there is no right to jury in one of the causes of action and both arise out of the 
same transaction, plaintiff must be precluded from having a jury trial “because 
[the court finds] the dichotomy codified in reverse buried in the middle of CPLR 
4102(c).” Id. 
50. See, e.g., Syndicated Commc’n Venture Partners IV, LP v. Bay Star 
Capital, LP, 859 N.Y.S.2d 125 (App. Div. 2008); Marcus v. Marcus, 788 
N.Y.S.2d 341 (App. Div. 2005); N.J. Steel Acquisition Corp. v. Von Roll, A.G., 
590 N.Y.S.2d 719 (App. Div. 1992). 
51. See Greenfield v. Philles Record, Inc., 674 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (App. Div. 
1997) (“With the addition of this cause of action [for rescission], it can no longer 
be said that money damages would afford a complete remedy, and its 
interposition therefore did result in a waiver of the right to a jury trial.”); 
Kurzner v. Sutton Owners Corp., 666 N.Y.S.2d 135, 135 (App. Div. 1997) (“The 
equitable relief sought [for an injunction] is not merely incidental to plaintiffs’ 
legal claims. Nor will money damages alone afford plaintiffs a complete 
remedy.”);  Trepuk v. Frank, 480 N.Y.S.2d 889, 891 (App. Div. 1984) (“That the 
complaint herein also seeks, in addition to an accounting, the return of money 
allegedly converted by the defendant or damages for fraudulent acts violative 
of the defendant’s fiduciary duty, does not in any sense change the reality that 
the main thrust of this action is one for an accounting.”); Kaufman v. Brenner, 
405 N.Y.S.2d 109, 109 (App. Div. 1978) (“Special Term did not err in vacating 
defendants’ demand for a jury trial since the main thrust of the action is in 
equity for specific performance.”). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/1
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incidental equitable claims is no bar to a jury trial.52  The test to 
determine whether equitable claims are “incidental”, as stated 
by the Appellate Division, is: 
 
If, in fact, a sum of money alone can provide full 
relief to the plaintiff under the facts alleged, then 
there is a right to a jury trial. . . . That equitable 
relief under similar circumstances may be 
available is not the determinant. What is critical 
is whether the facts pleaded in the particular case 
“imperatively require” equitable relief or whether 
under those facts the requested relief of money 
damages only can also provide full redress.53 
In other words, and by way of example, a plaintiff who calls 
 
52. See Moser v. Devine Real Estate, Inc., 839 N.Y.S.2d 843, 849 (App. 
Div. 2007) (“[T]he relevant inquiry ‘is . . . whether, when viewed in its entirety, 
the primary character of the case is legal or equitable . . . [T]he crux . . . sound[s] 
in breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, and the request for an 
accounting to ascertain any monetary damages suffered is incidental to those 
legal claims.”); Lex Tenants Corp. v. Gramercy N. Assocs., 726 N.Y.S.2d 852, 
853 (App. Div. 2001) (“[T]he primary character of the first 14 causes of action 
in the original complaint . . . was legal in nature, notwithstanding that two of 
these causes of action originally demanded an accounting.”); Hebranko v. 
Bioline Labs. Inc., 540 N.Y.S.2d 264 (App. Div. 1989). Equitable claims that 
have been held to be incidental to legal claims have included causes of action 
for: (a) an accounting; (b) reformation; (c) reinstatement; (d) rescission; (e) 
constructive trust; and (f) injunction. For examples of accounting, see Bressler 
v. Kalow, 785 N.Y.S.2d 328 (App. Div. 2004); Ossory Trading, S.A. v. 
Geldermann, Inc., 606 N.Y.S.2d 221 (App. Div. 1994); Abrams v. Rogers, 600 
N.Y.S.2d 223 (App. Div. 1993). For examples of reformation, see Fox v. 
Skolnick, 741 N.Y.S.2d 857 (App. Div. 2002); Harris v. Trustco Bank, 637 
N.Y.S.2d 527 (App. Div. 1996); Zekry v. Zekry, No. 102550/2008, 2012 WL 
5379388, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 26, 2012). For an example of reinstatement, 
see Schlick v. Am. Bus. Press, 668 N.Y.S.2d 35 (App. Div. 1998). For examples 
of rescission, see Paciello v. Graffeo, 779 N.Y.S.2d 526 (App. Div. 2004); Lipson 
v. Dime Sav. Bank of N.Y., 610 N.Y.S.2d 261 (App. Div. 1994); Ferry v. 
Poughkeepsie Galleria Co., 602 N.Y.S.2d 267 (App. Div. 1993). For examples of 
constructive trust, see Ossory Trading, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 222; Benn v. Benn, No. 
102344/2007, 2012 WL 4461730, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 16, 2012). For 
examples of injunction, see Poley v. Rochester Cmty. Sav. Bank, 584 N.Y.S.2d 
690 (App. Div. 1992); Lillianfield v. Lichtenstein, 694 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Sup. Ct. 
Kings Cnty. 1999). Courts have found each of these causes of action arising in 
other cases to be imperatively required. This finding supports the proposition 
that the true test is whether the equity claims are imperatively required or 
whether they are incidental to the legal claims such that money damages alone 
would afford full relief to the pleader. 
53. Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 527 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 1988). 
13
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upon the court to order specific performance of a contract for the 
fifty unique widgets he did not receive will not be fully redressed 
by fifty dollars—full redress would only be achieved by the 
court’s order to the defendant widget salesman to specifically 
perform under that contract.  Equity is imperatively required to 
afford complete relief to that plaintiff.  This scenario played out 
in Daley v. The Related Companies,54 where the underlying 
action concerned the plaintiff’s employment contract, which 
provided for money damages in the event that certain tax 
shelters were not available.55  The court reasoned that the 
plaintiff’s ability to take advantage of the tax benefits provided 
for in the contract would require the court to order specific 
performance, not merely money damages.56  The court thus held 
that the primary relief sought was equitable, as an order of 
specific performance was imperatively required to afford 
complete relief to the plaintiff, and because it was the plaintiff 
who demanded the jury trial, the demand was stricken. 
The mixing of imperatively required equity claims with legal 
claims causes a plaintiff to waive the right to a jury trial; 
however, where the equitable claims pleaded are merely 
incidental to legal claims, such that money damages would 
provide complete relief, the plaintiff is entitled to have his case 
heard by a jury.  The court’s holding in the case of Greenfield v. 
Philles Record, Inc.,57 also a First Department case, sheds light 
on the distinction between those equitable claims which are 
merely incidental and those which are imperatively required to 
afford complete relief to the plaintiff. 
In Greenfield, the plaintiffs, the former members of the 
singing group “The Ronettes,” brought suit against a record 
company for breach of contract and conversion, and asserted a 
cause of action for a constructive trust on money the defendants 
allegedly retained improperly.58  The cause of action for 
imposition of a constructive trust was incidental to the causes of 
action for breach of contract and conversion, as money damages 
could afford full relief to the plaintiffs.  The plaintiffs would have 
 
54. Daley v. Related Cos., 623 N.Y.S.2d 248 (App. Div. 1995). 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Greenfield v. Philles Record, Inc., 674 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 1997). 
58. Id.  
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/1
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consequently been entitled to a trial by jury, but they then 
amended their complaint, adding a cause of action for rescission 
of the contract at issue.59  Money damages would no longer 
provide complete relief to the plaintiffs because they also sought 
ownership of the master recordings.  The court held that the 
equitable claim for rescission was imperatively required to 
obtain full relief, and therefore, the plaintiffs waived their right 
to a jury trial.60 
Whether equitable relief is imperatively required and what 
constitutes the gravamen, main thrust or primary character of 
the action, is a mature, discretionary decision predicated upon 
what the particular pleader primarily seeks.  It is simply not 
enough for the court to count up the number of equitable and 
legal causes of action to decide this issue.  In Benn v. Benn,61 for 
example, the plaintiff’s causes of action were for an accounting, 
constructive trust, fraud, conversion, piercing the corporate veil, 
and a declaratory judgment.  The trial court applied the proper 
test and concluded that the plaintiff’s breach of contract and tort 
 
59. Id. 
60. Id.  While adding a cause of action that sounds in equity may act to 
waive trial by jury, the dismissal or withdrawal of a cause of action sounding 
in equity will not revive the right to demand a jury: “Once the right to a jury 
trial has been intentionally lost by joining legal and equitable claims, any 
subsequent dismissal, settlement or withdrawal of the equitable claim(s) will 
not revive the right to trial by jury.”  Anesthesia Assoc. of Mount Kisco, LLP v. 
N. Westchester Hosp. Ctr., 873 N.Y.S.2d 202, 203 (App. Div. 2009) (citing 
Zimmer-Masiello, Inc. v. Zimmer, Inc., 559 N.Y.S.2d 888, 890 (App. Div. 1990)). 
The right to a jury trial is not revived when plaintiff amends its complaint to 
eliminate the equitable cause of action and demand for equitable relief.  For 
example, in Kaplan v. Long Island Univ., 497 N.Y.S.2d 378 (App. Div. 1986), 
plaintiff brought suit for employment discrimination and included in her 
prayer for relief reinstatement to her former position and installation as a 
director. Plaintiff then secured employment elsewhere, amended the complaint 
to delete the prayer for reinstatement and entered into a stipulation with 
defendant preserving the right to claim entitlement to a jury trial as well as 
defendant’s right to object thereto. Id. at 508-09. When plaintiff filed a note of 
issue demanding trial by jury, defendant moved before Special Term to strike 
the demand but the court denied the motion upon the grounds that the 
amendment deleting the demand for reinstatement eliminated any equitable 
remedy from the prayer for relief. Id. at 509. The First Department disagreed 
and reversed, holding that the joinder of legal and equitable claims vitiates the 
right to a trial by jury and that right may not be revived by a subsequent 
“maneuver” to sever the equitable claim.  Id. 
61. See Benn v. Benn, No. 102344/2007, 2012 WL 4461730, at *1 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Apr. 16, 2012). 
15
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claims for fraud and conversion were the true basis for this 
lawsuit.62  The demand for an accounting, constructive trust, 
piercing the corporate veil and a declaration of title to the 
apartment in dispute were incidental to the plaintiff’s legal 
claims.63  Clearly, the Benn court did not count the number of 
causes of action that devolved from equity to reach the results 
that it did in holding that trial by jury had not been waived. 
Likewise, the mere use of a historically equitable procedure 
does not control the analysis.  The interpleader, for example, has 
equitable origins.64  In Geddes v. Rosen,65 the court made clear 
that although the procedure of interpleader developed in equity, 
the interpleading plaintiff and interpleaded defendants would be 
entitled to a jury trial because the basic nature of the case was 
an action at law.66  Under the proper analysis, neither the 
designation of the cause of action as one in equity in the note of 
issue nor the use of interpleader could change the basic nature 
of the action.67 
Even further, a meticulous evaluation of the pleadings is 
necessary because the plaintiff’s demands in its prayer for relief 
are not determinative of the issue, as the Second Department in 
Hebranko v. Bioline Laboratories68 noted: “Where a plaintiff 
alleges facts upon which monetary damages alone will afford full 
relief, inclusion of a demand for equitable relief in the 
complaint’s prayer for relief will not constitute a waiver of the 
right to a jury trial.”69  The court reasoned that because the 
gravamen of the action was to recover damages for breach of an 
indemnity agreement, the character of the action was essentially 
legal and the fact that a demand in the prayer for relief was 
“partially equitable in nature” did not alter the result.70  The 
result of this court’s analysis was controlled by the facts set forth 
 
62. Id. at *5-6 (citations omitted). 
63. Id. at *5. 
64. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Israel, 354 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1965); Lincoln 
Life & Annuity Co. v. Caswell, 813 N.Y.S.2d 385 (App. Div. 2006). 
65. See Geddes v. Rosen, 255 N.Y.S.2d 585 (App. Div. 1965). 
66. Id. at 590. 
67. Id. 
68. See Hebranko v. Bioline Labs., Inc., 540 N.Y.S.2d 264 (App. Div. 
1989).  
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or proved and not the demands in the prayer for relief.71 
As these cases illustrate, whether equitable relief is sought 
at all, whether equity claims are imperatively required for full 
redress and whether the primary character of the action is 
equitable requires careful analysis, whether it is asserted by the 
facts, in the prayer for relief or by the catch-all request for “such 
other and further relief as to this Court seems just and proper.” 
The foregoing reflects that the short-handed expression that 
mixing law and equity claims concerning the same transaction 
waives a right to a jury, truly and materially understates the 
reality that the pleading of incidental equitable claims does not 
prevent a plaintiff from demanding and having a jury trial. 
 
B. Jury Demand By Defendant 
 
The preceding section revealed the results of demands for 
jury trials that were initiated by plaintiffs in actions in which 
they had combined claims for legal and equitable relief arising 
from the same transaction.  Under the proper analysis, where 
equity is imperatively required to afford full redress to the 
plaintiff, the plaintiff’s demand for a jury trial should be 
stricken; where the equitable causes of action are merely 
incidental to the legal relief sought, the plaintiffs’ demands for a 
jury trial should be granted.  Where the defendant demands a 
jury trial in an action that combines claims for legal and 
equitable relief arising from the same transaction, the same 
analysis must control.72 
In Kaufman v. Brenner,73 the plaintiff demanded specific 
performance of a sales agreement or, alternatively, money 
damages representing the amount it would get from the 
defendant upon an award of specific performance.74  The court 
applied the proper analysis regarding the primary character of 
 
71. See also Wainwright & Page, Inc. v. Burr & McAuley, Inc., 5 N.E.2d 
64 (N.Y. 1936); Bruff v. Rochester Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 193 N.Y.S. 321 
(Sup. Ct. Monroe Cnty. 1922). 
72. See Azoulay v. Cassin, 478 N.Y.S.2d 366, 367 (App. Div. 1984); Trepuk 
v. Frank, 480 N.Y.S.2d 889, 890 (App. Div. 1984); Azoulay v. Cassin, 478 
N.Y.S.2d 366, 367 (App. Div. 1984). 
73. Kaufman v. Brenner, 405 N.Y.S.2d 109 (App. Div. 1978). 
74. Id. at 110 (Suozzi, J., dissenting). 
17
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the case and concluded that the “main thrust of the action” was 
equitable.75  The court then held that the defendant was not 
entitled to a jury trial of the plaintiff’s legal causes of action.  
That the main thrust of the action was equitable vitiated the 
right to a trial by jury for both parties on all issues.76  Similarly, 
in Downtown Art Co. v. Zimmerman,77 the defendant demanded 
a jury trial in an action in which the plaintiff had joined legal 
and equitable relief arising out of the same transaction.  The 
First Department affirmed the lower court’s determination that 
the primary character of the case was equitable because neither 
party would be fully redressed by an award of money damages, 
and held that the defendant was not entitled to a jury trial on 
any issues.78 
In Gordon v. Continental Casualty Co.,79 the plaintiff 
attempted to characterize its claims as equitable, but the court 
utilized the proper analysis and determined that the pleaded 
facts established a legal claim for relief.80  The court laid down 
the general rule with respect to the defendant’s right to a jury 
trial in actions seeking both legal and equitable relief: “the 
defendant is entitled to a jury trial if the issues for resolution are 
legal . . . the defendant is not so entitled if the legal relief is 
sufficiently incidental to equitable relief such that, at common 
law, the chancellor had jurisdiction over the entire matter.”81  In 
determining that the action was essentially legal, the 
defendant’s jury demand was granted.82 
In L.C.J. Realty Corp. v. Back,83 however, a contrary result 
was reached when the court did not employ a similar analysis 
concerning the combination of legal and equitable causes of 
action arising from the same transaction. The plaintiffs’ first 
cause of action seeking specific performance was grounded in 
equity and the second, seeking money damages, was grounded in 
 
75. Id. at 109. 
76. Id. 
77. Downtown Art Co. v. Zimmerman, 642 N.Y.S.2d 259 (App. Div. 1996). 
78. Id. 
79. Gordon v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 457 N.Y.S.2d 844 (App. Div. 1983). 
80. Id. at 846. 
81. Gordon, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 845. 
82. Id. at 847. 
83. See L.C.J. Realty Corp. v. Back, 326 N.Y.S.2d 28 (App. Div. 1971). 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/1
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law.84  The court did not pass on whether the plaintiffs waived 
their right to a jury trial and merely noted that by joining these 
claims the plaintiffs may have waived it—but, the court then 
brusquely stated that the plaintiffs could not “thereby deprive 
defendants Back of their right to a jury trial of all issues so 
triable.”85  The defendants were granted a jury trial.  It is worth 
noting that these defendants had injected counterclaims, which 
can appear to change the results flowing from the proper 
analysis.86  It is possible that the jury trial was actually granted 
on the counterclaims that the court found to be primarily legal. 
As the Back case illustrates, contrary results can be reached 
when the proper analysis is not utilized by the courts. 
Once the court determines that the primary character of the 
action is legal and money damages would afford full relief to the 
pleader, and any equitable claims are merely incidental, the 
defendant’s demand for a jury trial should be granted.  Without 
engaging in the proper analysis, it is inaccurate to say that the 
plaintiff’s complaint cannot deprive the defendant of a jury trial.  
Where the main thrust of the action is equitable, the defendant 
does not have a right to a jury on the incidental legal issues 
arising in the main action.  Though the analysis does not change, 
the results truly become divergent when defenses and 
counterclaims are interposed. 
 
C.  Equitable Defenses and Equitable Counterclaims 
 
Results become divergent following the use of the proper 
analysis when counterclaims and defenses are pled because 
CPLR Section 4101 disconnects equitable defenses and equitable 
counterclaims from the main action87 and because CPLR Section 
4102(c) specifically provides that legal counterclaims that are 
injected into an equitable action are triable by a jury.88  
 
84. Id. at 29. 
85. Id. (citations omitted). 
86. See infra Part III.C. 
87. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4101. 
88. Id. 4102(c). N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4102(c) makes clear that a party does not 
waive its right to a jury trial of the issues of fact arising upon a counterclaim, 
cross-claim or third party claim by asserting it in an action in which there is no 
right to a jury trial. 
19
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Commentators and courts have noted that because certain 
equitable defenses were statutorily required to be tried by jury 
prior to the adoption of the 1894 Constitution, the deprivation of 
a jury trial for all equitable defenses is arguably 
unconstitutional.89 
Under CPLR Section 4101, when a plaintiff brings a legal 
action, the defendant’s equitable counterclaims should not be 
submitted to a jury.  Under CPLR Section 4102(c), when a 
plaintiff brings an action sounding in equity, the defendant’s 
legal counterclaims should be tried by a jury if so demanded.90  
The counterclaims pled by a defendant enjoy the same careful 
analysis as the claims contained in the plaintiff’s complaint.91  
The rule remains: a pleader waives the right to a jury trial by 
joining legal and imperatively required equitable counterclaims 
arising out of the same transaction.92 
 
89. See Hudson View II Assocs. v. Gooden, 644 N.Y.S.2d 512, 515 (App. 
Div. 1996) (citations omitted); David D. Siegel, Practice Commentaries, in N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. 4101 (McKinney 2015). 
90. Siegel, supra note 89.  In the Second Department case of Vinlis 
Construction Co. v. Roreck, 260 N.Y.S.2d 245 (App. Div. 1965), the plaintiff 
brought an action for an accounting and filed a note of issue. More than a year 
later, plaintiff served a supplemental complaint adding its second and third 
causes of action. Id. at 247. The plaintiff did not serve a new note of issue, so 
the defendant could not avail himself of the statutory right to serve a jury 
demand within 10 days after the service upon him of a note of issue without a 
jury demand.  Id. The court held the defendant did not waive his right to a trial 
by jury with respect to the second and third causes of action contained in the 
supplemental complaint. Id.  See also Heller v. Hacken, 338 N.Y.S.2d 943 (App. 
Div. 1972). 
91. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3019(d) (“A cause of action contained in a counterclaim 
or a cross-claim shall be treated, as far as practicable, as if it were contained in 
a complaint”).  The right to jury trial where a legal counterclaim is interposed 
in an equitable action is statutory, not constitutional, as the practice of 
counterclaim in an equitable action was unknown at common law, so issues 
raised in such a manner are not within the provisions of the New York 
Constitution. See S. Klein, Inc. v. New Deal Bldg. Corp., 14 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Sup. 
Ct. Kings Cnty. 1939). 
92. See Herbil Holding Co. v. Mitrany, 783 N.Y.S.2d 611 (App. Div. 2004); 
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft v. Spinale, 576 N.Y.S.2d 24 (App. Div. 1991). 
The court in Cadwalader held that the analysis employed for the plaintiff’s 
action is the same analysis to be applied to a counterclaim. There, the plaintiff 
brought an action seeking payment of fees for services it rendered to the 
defendants, an action setting forth facts which would permit a judgment for a 
sum of money only.  Cadwalader, 576 N.Y.S.2d at 25. The defendants 
interposed a counterclaim seeking recovery of fees paid to the plaintiff that 
were in excess of the reasonable value of plaintiff’s services. Id. The defendants 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/1
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Where a plaintiff brings a law claim, some courts have held 
that the defendant waives its right to a jury trial on the main 
action when it brings related imperatively required equitable 
counterclaims.93  In Seneca v. Novaro,94 the plaintiff brought an 
action to recover a debt due to him—a legal action.  The 
defendant answered by defense and counterclaim, alleging that 
the plaintiff, in breach of his fiduciary duty, held thirty shares of 
stock as security for the repayment of the debt and prematurely 
sold the stock for a fraction of its market value.95  The defendant 
sought an accounting and demanded a jury trial.96  The court 
determined that the gravamen of the defense and counterclaim 
sounded in equity and held that when a defendant interposes an 
equitable counterclaim related to the legal action, the defendant 
has waived a jury trial even on the main claim.97 
Other courts have held that the defendant’s right to a jury 
trial on the main claim is preserved on the theory that a contrary 
holding would only encourage the defendant to bring his 
equitable claim separately.98  In International Playtex, Inc. v. 
CIS Leasing Corp.,99 the plaintiff brought an action sounding in 
law and demanded a non-jury trial.  The defendants asserted 
 
sought an accounting and discovery to aid in itemizing plaintiff’s charges as 
well as to compute the overpayment alleged by their counterclaim. Id. The 
defendants demanded a jury trial, and the plaintiff moved before the Supreme 
Court to strike the demand. The pleading of an accounting, an equitable action, 
the plaintiff argued, operated to waive the defendants’ right to a jury trial of 
the counterclaim. The Supreme Court had granted the plaintiff’s motion, but 
the order was subsequently reversed.  Id.  The proper question to be raised by 
the court that is deciding whether the defendant has the right to a jury trial on 
a counterclaim is “whether, when viewed in its entirety, the primary character 
of the case is legal or equitable.” Id. (citing Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 
527 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 1988)). Because the court found that the primary 
character of the action was legal and the primary character of the counterclaim 
was legal, a jury trial was proper. 
93. See Nationscredit Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Turcios, 865 N.Y.S.2d 556 (App. 
Div. 2008); Compact Electra Corp. v. Connell, 359 N.Y.S.2d 686 (App. Div. 
1974); STP Assocs., LLC v. Drasser, 941 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Dist. Ct. Nassau Cnty. 
2011). 
94. See Seneca v. Novaro, 437 N.Y.S.2d 401 (App. Div. 1981). 
95. Seneca, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 402. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Hudson View II Assocs. v. Gooden, 644 N.Y.S.2d 512 (App. Div. 1996). 
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equitable counterclaims related to the main action and 
demanded a jury trial.100  In deciding whether the injection of 
equitable counterclaims waives the defendants’ right to a jury 
trial on the main action, the court noted that to preserve the 
right to a jury trial on the main action the defendants would have 
to have commenced a separate action to assert the equitable 
counterclaims, which flies in the face of judicial economy, 
predictability and consistency.101  The court held the defendants’ 
assertion of related equitable counterclaims should not operate 
as a waiver of the right to a jury trial on plaintiff’s or defendants’ 
legal claims.102 
Frequently, when a plaintiff brings an action joining claims 
for legal and equitable relief, it is because the facts of the 
transaction giving rise to the legal claims are the same set of 
facts as those that gave rise to the equitable claim.  When the 
defendant’s counterclaims put the same transaction at issue, the 
facts giving rise to the counterclaims raise issues which are 
likely to be the same as those at issue in the main action and also 
in the plaintiff’s reply to those counterclaims.  When the facts to 
be heard in situations like that are so “intertwined” some courts 
have held that one trial of all issues before a jury is warranted.103 
The right to a trial by jury is fundamental to the New York 
system of jurisprudence and whether litigants have waived that 
right warrants a detailed analysis.  What the foregoing indicates 
is that there is a careful and complex analysis that is meant to 
be employed by the courts when faced with suits sounding in 
both law and equity, whether in plaintiff’s pleading or by 
defendant’s answer, and whether through defense, cross-claim 
or counterclaim. 
In England, however, non-jury civil trials have become the 
default.  There is no careful analysis to be employed.  Even 
though there are categories of cases triable of right by a jury, the 






103. Mercantile & Gen. Reinsurance Co. v. Colonial Assurance Co., 624 
N.E.2d 629 (N.Y. 1993); Hudson View II Assocs., 644 N.Y.S.2d at 516; John W. 
Cowper Co. v. Buffalo Hotel Dev. Venture, 471 N.Y.S.2d 913 (App. Div. 1984). 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/1
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IV.   The English Non-Jury System in Civil Actions 
 
Since the American system of jurisprudence took its form 
from the English system,104 it is valuable to consider the ways in 
which the English system evolved and considered in comparison 
to the American, specifically New York, the system of jury trial 
in civil actions.  In England, juries will not be impaneled in the 
majority of civil actions unless there is some other overriding 
reason to use a jury.105 
Many have professed that the jury trial has roots in 
England, possibly from even before the Norman Conquest in 
1066.106  The practice of jury trial was codified by the Magna 
Carta in 1215107 and evolved over the subsequent centuries.108  
The use of juries remained strong in England until the middle of 
the nineteenth century, when judges were given the right to 
refuse a demand for a jury.109 
Juryless trials were introduced by the County Courts Act of 
1846, where trial by judge alone for the recovery of small debts 
proved so popular that the option of a juryless trial was sought 
to be introduced into the superior courts, principally in the High 
 
104. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Philip Mazzei, supra note 13. 
105. Lewis v. Comm’r for Police, [2012] EWHC 1391 (QB). 
106. See Stephen Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an 
Unappreciated History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579 (1993); Edward L. Rubin, Trial 
by Battle, Trial by Argument, 56 ARK. L. REV. 261, 272 (2003). 
107. MAGNA CARTA para. 29 (1297), translation available at 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured_documents/magna_carta/translatio
n.html) (last visited Mar. 5, 2014). The Magna Carta states: 
 
No freemen is to be taken or imprisoned or disseised of his 
free tenement or of his liberties or free customs, or outlawed 
or exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we go against such a 
man or send against him save by lawful judgment of his peers 
or by the law of the land. 
 
Id. 
108. See Rubin, supra note 106, at 272-77, for a discussion of the evolution 
of the jury trial in England. 
109. Sally Lloyd-Bostock & Cheryl Thomas, Decline of the “Little 
Parliament”: Juries and Jury Reform in England and Wales, 62 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (1999). 
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Court,110 which heard the more complex cases.111  The general 
opinion concerning juries appeared to be that they were 
composed of unintelligent laypersons, largely inadequate to 
discharge judicial functions.112  The Common Law Procedure Act 
of 1854 began chipping away at the institution of jury trials, 
providing that in the superior courts, the litigants could agree to 
dispense with the jury.113  The Supreme Court of Judicature Act 
of 1873 reiterated that principle and provided an additional 
escape from jury trial, that is to say, even absent the consent of 
the parties a judge could order juryless trial if a matter required 
“any prolonged examination of documents or accounts, or any 
scientific or local investigation which cannot, in the opinion of 
the Court or a judge, conveniently be made before a jury.”114 
World War II brought about further restrictions by the 
Administration of Justice (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1939, 
which extended the discretion of the court to all civil cases, 
providing that there should be no trial by jury “unless the court 
or a judge is of the opinion that the question ought to be tried 
with a jury.”115  Needless to say, though these were only 
 
110. Senior Courts Act, 1981, c. 54, para 45(1) (Eng.). 
111. Michael Lobban, The Strange Life of the English Civil Jury 1837-
1914, in THE DEAREST BIRTHRIGHT OF THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND: THE JURY IN THE 
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 173 (John W. Cairns & Grant McLeod eds., 2002). 
112. Joshua Getzler, The Fate of the Civil Jury in Late Victorian England: 
Malicious Prosecution as a Test Case, in THE DEAREST BIRTHRIGHT OF THE 
PEOPLE OF ENGLAND: THE JURY IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 217, 220 
(John W. Cairns & Grant McLeod eds., 2002) (quoting the Common Law 
Commissioners of 1852-1853). 
113. Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict., c.125 (Eng.) “The 
Parties to any Cause may, by Consent in Writing, signed by them or their 
Attorneys, as the Case may be, leave the Decision of any Issue of Fact to the 
Court  . . . and the Proceedings upon and after such Trial, as to the Power of 
the Court or Judge, the Evidence, and otherwise, shall be the same as in the 
Case of Trial by Jury.” Id. at para 1. 
114. Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, para 57 
(Eng).  The Rules of 1883 further clarified that the default mode of trial was 
without jury: “In every cause or matter, unless under the provisions of Rule 6 
of this Order a trial with a jury is ordered, or under Rule 2 of this Order either 
party has signified a desire to have a trial with a jury, the mode of trial shall 
be by a judge without a jury.” Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, Order XXXVI, 
para 7(a). Basically, trial by judge alone became the prime mode of trial, with 
the exceptions of allowing trial by jury on application if convenient, and 
allowing it as of right where reputation was at issue. Lobban, supra note 111, 
at 186. 
115. Robert Wyness Millar, A Septennium of English Civil Procedure, 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss3/1
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temporary provisions, what followed was a sharp fall in the 
proportion of jury trials.116  There are now only about two dozen 
civil jury trials per year in England and Wales,117 and in the 
Queen’s Bench Division, which is the only area that sits juries in 
the High Court, there have been only seven jury trials since 
2010.118 
Today, in all civil cases in England whether a case will be 
tried by a jury rests in the discretion of the judge.  The Supreme 
Court Act preserves the right to a trial by jury in only four types 
of civil cases: fraud, libel and slander, malicious prosecution and 
false imprisonment, and even then, the judge, upon certain 
grounds in his discretion, may reject the jury demand.119  In all 
other civil cases, whether trial will be by jury rests solely in the 
discretion of the court.  That discretion has been exercised in 
favor of juryless trials.  In fact, it has been said that the civil jury 
took a death blow in personal injury actions,120 which do not 
carry a qualified right to a jury trial, with the decision in Ward 
v. James.121  The Court of Appeal in that case held: “So important 
is it that the judge ought not, in a personal injury case, to order 
trial by jury save in exceptional circumstances.”122 
Even in those matters to which a qualified right to a jury 
trial attaches, the court has broad discretion to dispense with a 
jury, where it determines the trial will require the prolonged 
examination of documents or the case deals with complex or 
technical matters.123  The trend has been toward juryless trials 
as “[c]ontemporary practice has an eye, among other things, to 
proportionality; the greater predictability of the decision of a 
professional judge; and the fact that a judge gives reasons.”124 
 
1932-1939, 25 WASH. U. L. REV. 525, 537-38 (1940). 
116. Lobban, supra note 111, at 209 n.180. 
117. Getzler, supra note 112, at 218 n.6. 
118. Letter from Bob Weston, Data Quality Manager, Her Majesty’s 
Courts & Tribunals Serv. Performance, Analysis & Reporting Team, to Shari 
Hochberg (July 15, 2014) (on file with author). 
119. Supreme Court Act, 1981, c. 54, para 69 (Eng.). 
120. Lloyd-Bostock & Thomas, supra note 109, at 13. 
121. Ward v. James, [1966] 1 Q. B. 273 (Eng.). 
122. Id. 
123. Id. See also Getzler, supra note 112, at 221-22. 
124. Lewis v. Comm’r for Police, [2012] EWHC 1391 (QB) (Eng.) (quoting 
Times Newspapers Ltd. v. Armstrong, [2006] EWCA 519 (Eng.)). 
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In a recent defamation case, Lewis v. Commissioner for 
Police,125 the plaintiff argued for jury trial on the grounds that 
the case involved prominent figures in public life and questions 
of great national interest.126  The court accepted that the plaintiff 
was a prominent figure as of the date of the trial, that the 
integrity of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis was at 
issue, and that this constituted an exceptional case.127  
Nevertheless, the court held, trial would be by judge alone.128 
Justice Tugendhat expressed his reasoning for ordering a 
juryless trial under the specific circumstances.129  One important 
reason was that the trier of fact would be charged to determine 
the meaning of the words that were alleged to be defamatory; the 
test being what meaning would the hypothetical reader attribute 
to the words.130  This, Justice Tugendhat wrote, “may cause 
difficulties even to lawyers who understand the purpose of that 
unfamiliar rule.”131 
It is evident from the history and evolution of the civil jury 
trial in England that juries are disfavored for a variety of 
reasons, among them the lack of uniformity in judgment, the fear 
that juries are not able to understand the evidence, the inability 
to determine the jury’s reasoning in the verdict and the high cost 
of the jury.  In New York, whether or not these concerns are not 
present, the right to a jury trial is constitutionally protected, and 
it is the job of the litigants, attorneys and the court to ensure 
that the civil jury has the right tools to make reasoned 
determinations. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
Historically, juries were not to be impaneled for equitable 
actions. Today, statutes purport to dictate that an action at law 
coupled with equitable issues cannot to be tried by jury. In 
practice, sometimes mixing claims for law and equity precludes 
 
125. Id. 
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a litigant’s right to a jury trial and sometimes it does not.  
Finding that a waiver has resulted can only happen following a 
detailed analysis of the pleadings. The cases holding that the 
mere joinder of claims for legal and equitable relief waive the 
litigants’ right to a jury trial are devoid of the proper analysis 
and may be reflective of the concerns that the learned judges in 
the 19th and early 20th centuries expressed. But those same 
concerns that ostensibly brought about the trend toward non-
jury civil trials in England are just not recognized in New York 
in the modern era. The people are guaranteed a right to a trial 
by jury in civil actions and that sacred right should not be 
disturbed without great care and rumination.  The courts must 
engage in the proper analysis to determine whether litigants 
have in fact waived their right to a trial by jury by joining causes 
of action for legal and equitable relief. 
It is clear that claims which were historically equitable 
continue to blend into law such that the line distinguishing the 
two has become blurred. Because of the significant import of 
predictability and consistency, so long as the courts engage in a 
standard practice applying the same analysis concerning waiver 
of the right to a jury trial, any disagreement among courts and 
judges concerning the treatment of certain causes of action may 
dissipate. 
Even though the civil litigation system in New York derived 
from the English system, the right to a trial by jury in civil 
actions is protected both by the Constitution and by statute. 
Trial by jury, so fundamental to the American system of 
jurisprudence, should not be deemed waived merely because the 
litigants have demanded, or have asserted facts giving rise to, 
both legal and equitable relief.  New York courts must engage in 
the proper analysis to ensure this constitutional and statutory 
right has not been undermined.  Thus, the short-handed 
expression that mixing law and equity waives the right to a jury 
trial misstates the reality that where the pleader’s claims are 
primarily legal in character and money damages affords full 
relief, the pleading of incidental equitable claims is no bar to a 
jury trial. 
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